Culture war? - Fiorina et al. 2005

Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. 2005. Culture war? : the myth of a polarized America. New York: Pearson Longman.

Such confess - “Jesus Christ changed my life” – is widely observed in American and also in my home country. Especially, the name of Jesus, at least in South Korea, is contested by itself. The name of Jesus is equated with American Solider, and frequently American President. Usually, Jesus followers are very extremely anti-communistic (most South Koreans are very anti-communistic, due to the Korean War), and very negative towards Russia and China, and also emphasize the blood-relationships with the US. Religion, whatever morals it argues and takes and propagates to the public, is not unrelated with politics because religion believers are also voters who can determine the political power.

Personally I believe culture war exists. Also I assume some arguments are seriously overblown as the authors (Fiorina et al.) pointed out. However, in my opinion, culture war can be serious if some situations come (Probably no one knows the day!). Why? First, even if there were only some people who cause culture war, they hold high solidarity, indicating that their power could be more than dispersed or heterogeneous others. In an emergency, the small but well-connected fews dominates the large but isolated manys, as shown in Animal Farm or in Nazi. (Be careful, I am not negative toward certain religions. I self-identified myself as a god-believer).

Second, the winning margin in duopoly system like the USA, small number of supporters – who do not change their minds in whatever situations – are attractive, giving politicians safe political bulwarks. Consider LDS (frequently called Mormons). I believe if they were scattered across the continent, their political power would not be so influential. While the geographically concentrated particular religion believers may hurt their success in nation-wide politics (e.g., Romney), it is also true that such loyal and well-predicted success warrants the survival of certain morals that a religion wants to hold.

While I read the authors’ findings and arguments, I agree with their conclusion but I do not think their findings are truly enough to deny ‘culture war’ ideas. Some of the findings (especially, the figure) seem inappropriate because the vertical axis (i.e., Y-axis in XY coordinate) is assumed to have the full scale, which, in turn, hides any subtle (but could be substantial in real world situation) differences between so-called two sides. I think their way to provide their findings has some problems..

Also, as a media scholar, I have to point out their assumption on the role of media. As a one factor creating the illusion of culture wars, the authors mentioned the media which almost give up providing meaningful neutral information by emphasizing the entertainment value of the contents. However, I am less inclined to agree with this point. First, I am not sure why the ‘commercial’ media should have such norms. Their purpose is to make money, not to report facts. Second, without people’s preexisting stereotyped culture-war idea, the media can make such illusion?

Despite some disagreements of mine, I believe their conclusion should be seriously taken because of the danger of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics - Edited by Jeffrey Haynes (2010)

Haynes, Jeffrey, ed. 2010. Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Handbook is the great guide for the beginner of the field, like me who are recently interested in the relationship between politics and religion. My approach (not yet self-assured) assume that religion is a machine of ethical messages which regulate or guide people’s judgment over social objects; and also assume that politics is a symbolic process created by political actors whose messages combine materialistic interests, moral superiority, and constructed social knowledge over the natural and cultural world. With the message as the conceptual link, I believe (or assume) that religion and politics reciprocally influence (actually, nearly all social scientists know that they are under mutual influence).

Anyway, the coverage of the handbook is so huge. Except the introduction chapter authored by the editor, there are four parts, as follow:

Part I: The world religions and politics
Part II: Religion and governance
Part III: Religion and international relations
Part IV: Religion security and development

I skipped all the chapters, but I do want to make an index what chapters might be re-read in the future (if my interest is maintained in the near or distance future)

Chapter 2: Buddhism and politics (by Peter Freidlander): Why? 1) S. Koran has lots of Buddhists. 2) Mostly known as its non-violent tendency (compared with other religions).

Chapter 3: Christianity: Protestantism (by Paul Fireston): Why? 1) the traditional topic since Max Weber’s intellectual invention. 2) the religious majority in US

Chapter 4: The Catholic church and Catholicism in global politics (Allen Hertzke): Why? 1) the biggest religious institution in the world 2) in S Korea, Catholic’s social contribution is most prominent (pro-democratization)

Chapter 5: Confucianism, from above and below (Michael Barr): 1) is it religion? (I don’t think so) It seems more likely to be an ideology like Liberalism, Maxism, etc. 2) basically ambivalent, and under-developed political ideology which can be both progressive and recessive.

Chapter 7: Islam and Islamism (Andrea Teti & Andrea Mura): 1) I am very ignorant of Islam and its culture

Chapter 10: Secularisation and politics (Steve Bruce): 1) Interesting and also important topic in the relationship between politics and religion, 2) secularization, in my view, is contested concept. Not sure what is secular and not sure whether ‘secular’ is distinguished from ‘sacred’ in terms of spirituality or religiosity.

Chapter 11: Religious fundamentalisms (Jeffrey Haynes): 1) Rising political tendency

Chapter 15: Religion and civil society (David Herbert): Personally, I read this chapter with the biggest interest and fun.

Chapter 16: Religious commitment and socio-political orientations: Different patterns of compartmentalism among Muslims and Christians? (Thorleif Petterson) 1) Model paper dealing with the effect of religion on politics using quantitative data. 2) good study to counter-argue over-exaggerated differences between Christians and Muslims.

Chapter 23: Religion and women: Canadian women’s religious volunteering: compassion, connections and comparisons (Brenda O’Neill): Good study showing the ambivalent characteristics of religion and its role in civil society (positive because it educates females as connected and communitarian citizens; negative because its role is highly concentrated in family and other conventionally women’s roles).

Chapter 25: Changing the climate of religious internationalism: evangelical responses to global warming and human suffering (Noah J. Toly): Dealing with the connection between religious messages and environmental issues (global warming). Personally more interesting because of the re-modeling four rivers in S. Korea despite the majority’s opposition, especially led by religious leaders who are Buddhist monks and Catholic priests including only a few Protestant pastors.

When atheism becomes religion - Chris Hedges (2009)

Hedges, Chris. 2009. When atheism becomes religion : America's new fundamentalists. New York: Free Press.

Actually the title of the book (originally, I don’t believe in atheists, in 2008) summarizes what the author wants to argue in the book. The core is clear: The arrogant pseudo-scientific atheism is actually the same as any arrogant religious fundamentalism. In other words, atheists and religious bigotry are the same because of their philosophical foundation, i.e., fundamentalism contaminated by violent utopian ideas.

Hedges argues that this pseudo-scientific fundamentalists are originated from the legacy – specifically bad legacy of Enlightenment in Western Europe. Blind obedience to the progress of human moral. As far as I’ve understood, this type of naïve optimism about the reality is the enemy that he wanted to accuse in the previous book. Specifically he mentions Harris, Dawkins, Wilson, Blackmore, and others as examples of pseudo-scientific atheists.

The biggest virtue of this book is the beautifully wedded couple of “common-sensical ethical arguments” and “ethics based on REAL experience of the author (as a war correspondent).” Scientists, especially arm-chaired scientists studying and researching in the library or office, are easily distracted or tempted by seriously abstract thoughts that are sometimes sur-real. Those arguments frequently are based on hypothetically assumed person, rather than a real person who is crying, sweating, or bleeding. Actually criticizing religious creeds is so easy because I believe any bibles (of course, including Christian Bible) have very very contrasting and conflicting teachings. In one page, it teaches endless altruism or self-sacrifice, but suddenly it orders its believers to kill others without any mercy. The evil teaching can be easily mobilized for the justifications of genocide, adultery, illegal polygamy and the like. However, it is also similarly easy to criticize bad consequences contrived by modern science (or scientific devices) like atomic bombs and MDW.

From the ordinary mind (at least my mind), it is not fair to compare good science with bad religion, as pseudo-scientists do. (the exactly opposite case would be true, either). I believe the author’s critic on pseudo-scientific atheists is not critics on all modern science. He, I assume, simply warns the arrogance of such atheists and the danger such arrogance would result, as blind religious fundamentalists do.

Some limitations are observed. First, this book is very thin, compared with the previous one (American Fascists). I assume the reason might be the author’s hastiness, in order to reply to people who may misunderstand him as one of such atheists. Second, his critics are mainly about the attitude or viewpoints of such atheists, rather than their over-interpretation of scientific findings (especially, evolutionary biology). While he mentioned Charles Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and other so-called orthodox scientists, his study does not cover recent achievements in such field. Of course, it is not the author’s duty to do that because it is not his speciality. However, it is a little bit disappointing not to analyze why such writers show such seemingly arrogant “over-confidence” over the findings… Finally, when analyzing meme theory, I assume he seems to over-generalize the implications of meme theory. While it is actually true that meme theory is too much contaminated by misguided evolutionary biology, it is also true that it is simply a way to explain social or cultural phenomena, based on biological explanations. I have to disagree with some analyses about meme theory. All types of knowledge are inter-influenced by other types of knowledge. For example, is it true that Aristotelian philosophy influences St. Aquina’s theology?

Despite some limitations (actually my dissatisfactions), I am satisfied with the book (as one of the general and ordinary readers)

PS: As a ph.d student, this book taught me many lessions about knowledge, especially so-called scientific knowledge. At least, it tells that precise theory at the level of high abstraction is bad theory at the mundane level. Especially, social sciences… Society is not abstract, it is real. (Unless you live in a place of full anarchy).

American fascists - Chris Hedges (2007)

Hedges, C. (2007). American fascists : the Christian Right and the war on America. New York: Free Press.

There are three shocks after reading this book. First, the arguments generated by so-called Christian fundamentals (evangelists) are much more serious than I expected and am heard from other sources. Second, the author got an academic degree (MA) from Divinity at Princeton University. In other words, this is a criticism from a person who has strong Christian backgrounds. Third, the problems (in a secular person’s eyes) are similarly or virtually the same observed in my home country, South Korea.

Recent interest in the relationship between religion and politics, actually, starts with my interest in so-called identity politics and new social phenomena that cannot be easily reduced to rational utility theory in political science. Previous books, in general, have to deal with very abstract arguments over the virtues or vices of the politics, and the potential influences of religious conservatives on political process does not seem so serious. However, this book starts and introduces with very vivid story which is based on personal narrative and specific arguments, and thus I think very readable and concretized and solid. Probably the reason may be found that the author is a journalist whose writings target at ordinary readers without having special backgrounds over expertise.

The conclusion is clear: Do not tolerate those who do not show any tolerance.

While very persuasive arguments, I have several questions. First, the relationship between poverty and religion. While I agree with the author’s analysis (see chapter 2. The culture of despair), the question is that how the poor can be delivered from the abject poverty? The author implicitly argues that saving the poor (precisely working poor, or people having no secure jobs) should be done by public sector or nation. However, the policy decision has to be based on so-called majority rule (at least in the US), and therefore it takes time to be effective. While I am less favorable towards ‘too much intervention of the church saving the poor,’ I have to think that the poor should be helped from anyone including the church (regardless their sections or denominations), if the nation does not help. If the salvation comes from intolerant religious conservatives, the first job for a society is ‘not to be starved to death.’

Second, how can normal Christians read Bible? The first chapter (faith) clarifies that the Christian Bible (including both Old Testaments and New Testaments) has very mixed messages. One page, it teaches people self-sacrifice, love, share, and others. But on the different page, it justifies killing, genocide, theft, or others (e.g., Holy Termination). So-called Holy City Plan – probably suggested by John Calvin and his followers in other places in the world – actually and literally ask pastors and believers to kill others in the name of God. How can ordinary people read the Bible and understand it? Too much ambivalence coexists, as the author admits. He points out this potential aggressiveness and intolerances taught by the Bible, but does not provide any solutions or recommendations. Of course, it is not an easy job and the author may have no obligation to do that. However, without this one, Christian religions (regardless of any sections or denominations) and Islam, and even Buddhists in many cases have to be given up because they are intolerant in some sense.

Third, what is the limit of religious conscience? This is somewhat dangerous, if the author is correct. The Rosa Parker case, or Martin Luther King, Jr case strongly showed that religious conscience helps society and democracy building. For example, in the war, how can we see a person who voluntarily rejects the gun in order to protect own religious conscience? I think this kind of religious conscience should be protected, even if the religion is conservative, Satanic, or highly intolerant towards other minorities. Probably, I assume that the author warns the danger of expansive or aggressive use of religious conscience, rather than a tool to protect a person’s world from external or secular politics or demands.

Anyway interesting book and thoughtful!

Sacred and secular (2004) - Norris and Inglehart

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). Sacred and secular : religion and politics worldwide. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.

While the previous book (Religion and Politics in the United States, Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2011) deals with the relationship between religion and politics in the context of one nation (i.e., USA), this book deals with the relationship in the international context.

The main argument is that secularization becomes important in developed countries, but religion becomes more and more important in under-developed (or un-developed) countries. The result is, according to Norris and Inglehart, interesting because the non-believers are decreasing (due to secularization in the rich countries) while believers are increasing (due to the emphasis of traditional values in religions in the poor countries).

Especially, new social controversies in Western European countries and the United States are about the paradoxical two trends (secularization and low fertility rate VS religious dominance and high fertility rate). For example, UK and France recently observe decreasing fertility rate and (have to) need new population from other countries (mostly non-European and non-traditional religion believers). New conflicts, thus, have to show multi-layered contradictions (“minority – foreign religions – poor” versus “majority – Christian – rich or was-rich”).

In general, the book is well-written (i.e., used easy and clear terms) by two great empirical positivists. Usually, empirical positivists’ writing, I believe, is easy to read. This is a great virtue of this book, unlike other books dealing with religion and politics authored by pure theorists. While some of the expressions seem redundant, I like the redundancy which makes the whole idea much clearer.

While the data sets and analyses of the relationship between religion and social values, political status, and other macro-level indices seem interesting (or clear, in the authors’ terms), the general impression on my brain was not so telling. First and foremost, Weberian and Durkheimian understanding of religion is too much simplified. Personally, I do not believe that those so-called classic sociological ideas can be tested via (relatively crude) survey polls or national indexes. This seems a kind of greed, I believe. I am not sure whether the operationalization does reflect what Weber or Durkheim wants to define… Actually, those big names were born and dead before the birth of hypothetical testing. Testing would be fascinating idea in some areas, but not always, in my poor thoughts.

My thought on this book …. Good book, but not the best book.

PS: What is the role of statistics when studying the relationship between religions and politics? Obviously, so-called liberal pluralism is mainly motivated by the number, but religion can be reduced into some operational (or statistical) measures? This question is not to criticize the authors’ position (actually, some of my research relied statistics or statistical justifications TOO MUCH), but to refresh my minds in order to be alive and not to be crunched by naïve inertia which is frequently called as ‘statistical or systematic research…..’

The Chosen Peoples (2010) - Gitlin and Leibovitz

Gitlin, T., & Leibovitz, L. (2010). The Chosen Peoples: America, Israel, and the Ordeals of Divine Election. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Reading Todd Gitlin’s book – Although there is one more author - is always enjoyable, at least to me. Probably, anyone who completed communication theory course would know Todd Gitlin, as a main critic of so-called effect study which might be traceable to Paul F. Lazarsfeld’s work. Unfortunately, Gitlin’s work, as one of Annenberg students, is remembered as one of unhappy works because his main critic goes for Elihu Katz, the last Ph.D student of Paul Lazarsfeld.

However, as far as I’ve remember, Elihu Katz was – and probably am - very positive toward Gitlin’s criticism (while he does not want to fully agree with Gitlin’s punch-line). E. Katz praises his creativity, novelty, and activism. Probably due to the academic enemy’s praise, I started to read some of Gitlin’s books.

The newest book is the same, it is enjoyable and fun to read. The book comprises of four main chapters with one short chapter (ie, introduction). The main argument is well summarized in the subtitle. It deals with two religious tradition, Jewish and (evangelical) Christian tradition. So-called ‘Divine selection’ – The God choose one ethnic group to realize the God’s will on the earth – was one of main faiths in two religious traditions, which easily creates potential (including already realized) controversies or fights with other ethnic groups who frequently have different religious traditions.

The first chapter, “A stiff-necked people,” summarizes the history of construction of Israel in originally Palestine land. As the title implies, the authors seem to argue that the divine selection leads to its believers to be stiff-necked, i.e., arrogant and rude toward other groups who do not agree with the idea. The second chapter, “His almost chosen people,” summarizes the history of construction of the United States in originally Native Americans’ land. The title comes from Abraham Lincoln’s address that the US is the land to realize God will and Americans are God’s almost chosen people.

While the first two chapters deal with the stories of peoples who believe that they are chosen by the God, the third chapter deals with the other side of those peoples, mostly original Palestine residents. I think the contents are already introduced much in other literature or books (e.g., West Bank or Gaza).

The final chapter is about the fact why Israel and the US are so well wed in international politics. Probably, the most unique argument could be found in the last chapter because Gitlin and Leibovitz argue that there are something emotional bonds between two chosen peoples, and it is not enough (note that their arguments add something previous, not replace it) to consider the link as economical and/or political. Of course, the emotional bonds, according to the authors, can be traced to the idea of “Divine selection.”

I do not have full information and expertise to tell whether their conclusion is true or not. However, it is interesting idea with two reasons. First, the construction process of nation-building in Israel and the US highly resembles each other. Second, two nations emphasize importance of spirits in order to unite the intra-national differences, but two nations wield very secularized power in order to maintain their will or spirits in international conflicts.

Personally interesting because the authors showed the relationship between religions and politics with historical records and secular (i.e., without spiritual) reading of the religious texts. However, two questions remained and (I think) are not mentioned or addressed:

(1) Muslims are not chosen? I do not think so. Maybe they believe that they are chosen. Differently, other religion holders will think that they are chosen (e.g., Shinto believers in Japan). Personally I do not agree with the argument that the uniqueness of the idea of ‘Divine selection’ is special in Jewish and/or Christian traditions. The difference is the ‘self-esteem without despising others’ versus ‘self-esteem by ignoring others.’
(2) The “special friendship” between the US and Israel hit one question in my head. If Jewish thinks they are chosen and American thinks the same, then why they fight each other? According to divine selection idea that the authors introduced, (I assume) God selects only ONE people. If so, then one of two chosen peoples is probably wrong and hurts own identity and faith. Then natural question would be: why they do not fight each other?

PS: By the way, it would be ambivalently interesting to mention South Korea, as a comparable examplar nation of Israel in the US's relationship. For example, the authors said that "Neither the United States nor Israel parades any particular affinity with democratic India, say or South Korea. These nations are friends, but not special friends (p.187)"

Religion and Politics in the United States

Religion and Politics in the United States - Kenneth D. Wald & Allison Calhoun-Brown (2011, 6th ed)

As the authors noted, two topics (religion and politics) are excellent topics which make friends into enemies. Probably, those two are all value-laden, and thus any conflicts will be easily turned into fundamental differences that cannot be compromised.

However uncomfortable those topics seem, it is not difficult to disagree with the book's general conclusion (i.e., religion and politics is related, and therefore political institution, dynamics between politicians, or ordinary people's evaluation of political events or issues has to be highly related with religious values, attitudes, or speech of religious elites).

In the first chapter, the authors reminded readers that religion is still important. They conter-argued some of the trends of secularism and perception that religion and politics are separated. Religion is still important and the authors provided some statistics of religiosity, religious activities with discussion of religion-related measures and their limitations.

The 2nd chapter actually drew pictures of institutional relationship between the US (state and federal government) and religion or faith-based community. In general, the effect of relgion on the politics (or vice versa) dealt with by the authors here is very macro and law-related. (Note that they mentioned three components, creed, institution, and social/cultural group). One of my dissatisfactions is no consideration of religious message and/or its characteristic(s). Differently put, I believe that religion is actually discursive process and cannot exist without continuous communicative action (e.g., reading the Book, summarizing the messages that doesn't ignite any conflicting ideas in one's mind, sending the message to others who may or may not be interested in hearing that, or influencing own belief(s) onto others' minds via persuasive, or implusive ways). Anyway, it was discussed in the whole book here and there, but it was not pointed out as one feature that is very characterized as the main relationship between politics and religion.

The 3rd chapter discussed the cultural effect of religion on American politics. Here religion is limited into mainline Protestants (Presbyterian or Episcopalian), evangelical Protestants (complex and diverse, but characterized as one loosely defined group after Great Awakening), and Catholics. In general, there are two traditions: priestly (managing or listening) vs. prophetic (leading or mobilizing). Or vertical (God-humans) vs. horizontal (neighbors).

The 4th chapter is actually the summary between the state and the religion. There are a list when/where/why religion and the state collides and how the judge made history and seeked balanced between secular power and holy influences.

The 5th chapter discusses how religion lead to religious movements. The authors relied on social movement theory and framing theory. In this chapter, motives and means are discussed.

The 6th chapter further mentioned the last condition, i.e., opportunity, which converts faith-based community members into religious protesters. Under what condition, religious interests (emotional or reason-based) are formed, allied with other different faith-holders, and what policies and what policy solutions are obtained?

The 7th chapter discusses the relationship between religion and public opinion. As many observers noted, religion provides fundamental values or living principles that guide interpersonal or social behaviors. The authors showed some examples how religious lessons are intertwined with secular ideology or moral political issues. Especially, the subsection of 'foreign policy' does read with excellent interests of mine.

The 8th chapter provides one recent eminent example showing the enormous real world effects of religious movements or faith-communities on real political processes. Evangelical Protestants were known as strong supporters for Republicans (esp. so-called Neo-Conservatives). The rise of evangelical Protestants started with Jimmy Carter (1976), but failed. However, R. Reagon and G. W. Bush succeeds in part because of the unanimous support from evangelical Protestants. However, evangelical Protestants are double-edged sword, indicating that loyal supporters backlashes against the mobilization of other religious sections.

The 9th chapter discusses other politically eminent religions, Catholics, mainline Protestants, and Jews. Catholics for abortion issue, mainline Protestants as mainstream of religion that can be accepted without creating unnecessary conflicts, and Jews and their influences on foreign policies (Palestine; Arabs)

The 10th chapter is devoted to minorities and their religion, e.g., Hispanic's Catholic, Latinos's Protestants, Black Protestants, and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and real minorities such as Hindus, Buddism, etc. Latinos/Hispanics sounds interesting because their population is fastly growing, and their vote is becoming cast vote. Black Protestants has been important social movement source among Afro-Americans. LDS is interesting because its believers are geographically oriented and succeeded to produce renowned politicians.

The 11th chapter discusses reactions of religion sectors towards gay issue or women issues (abortion and female clergy). Very interesting chapter, personally. Recommend the second or third reading in the future.

The final chapter discusses the generalized conclusion about the effect of religion on American political life. I believe this chapter sounds interesting, and provided some answers towards my question - basically ambivalent nature of religion (Conservative & Progressive; Authoritative & Democratic; Discriminating & Integrating). Well-written section. One of the (subjectively felt) limitations is the lack of specific research in this area, if the authors' introduction is complete. Most cited works, based on my reading, are anecdotal or based on projections from other social scientists. However, I believe the last two chapters do read with my full joy. Thanks for the authors.