Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. 2005. Culture war? : the myth of a polarized America. New York: Pearson Longman.
Such confess - “Jesus Christ changed my life” – is widely observed in American and also in my home country. Especially, the name of Jesus, at least in South Korea, is contested by itself. The name of Jesus is equated with American Solider, and frequently American President. Usually, Jesus followers are very extremely anti-communistic (most South Koreans are very anti-communistic, due to the Korean War), and very negative towards Russia and China, and also emphasize the blood-relationships with the US. Religion, whatever morals it argues and takes and propagates to the public, is not unrelated with politics because religion believers are also voters who can determine the political power.
Personally I believe culture war exists. Also I assume some arguments are seriously overblown as the authors (Fiorina et al.) pointed out. However, in my opinion, culture war can be serious if some situations come (Probably no one knows the day!). Why? First, even if there were only some people who cause culture war, they hold high solidarity, indicating that their power could be more than dispersed or heterogeneous others. In an emergency, the small but well-connected fews dominates the large but isolated manys, as shown in Animal Farm or in Nazi. (Be careful, I am not negative toward certain religions. I self-identified myself as a god-believer).
Second, the winning margin in duopoly system like the USA, small number of supporters – who do not change their minds in whatever situations – are attractive, giving politicians safe political bulwarks. Consider LDS (frequently called Mormons). I believe if they were scattered across the continent, their political power would not be so influential. While the geographically concentrated particular religion believers may hurt their success in nation-wide politics (e.g., Romney), it is also true that such loyal and well-predicted success warrants the survival of certain morals that a religion wants to hold.
While I read the authors’ findings and arguments, I agree with their conclusion but I do not think their findings are truly enough to deny ‘culture war’ ideas. Some of the findings (especially, the figure) seem inappropriate because the vertical axis (i.e., Y-axis in XY coordinate) is assumed to have the full scale, which, in turn, hides any subtle (but could be substantial in real world situation) differences between so-called two sides. I think their way to provide their findings has some problems..
Also, as a media scholar, I have to point out their assumption on the role of media. As a one factor creating the illusion of culture wars, the authors mentioned the media which almost give up providing meaningful neutral information by emphasizing the entertainment value of the contents. However, I am less inclined to agree with this point. First, I am not sure why the ‘commercial’ media should have such norms. Their purpose is to make money, not to report facts. Second, without people’s preexisting stereotyped culture-war idea, the media can make such illusion?
Despite some disagreements of mine, I believe their conclusion should be seriously taken because of the danger of self-fulfilling prophecy.
Sunday, December 12, 2010
Saturday, December 11, 2010
Post-broadcast democracy - Markus Prior (2007)
Prior, Markus. 2007. Post-broadcast democracy : how media choice increases inequality in political involvement and polarizes elections. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Obviously, recent trend in public opinion studies has emphasized the importance of exogenous factors, such as community environment (e.g., racial composition, or population density, or community income level), median environment like the main predictor variable in this study (e.g., the number of stations, or the time when the cable television was introduced).
Markus Prior’s study seems plausible and his evidence is telling and supportive of what he wants to say in his book. The main arguments in this book,
1. Recently, media provide more choice (or opportunities) for people,
2. People have different media content preference, which influences the intake of their political information (measured as relative entertainment preference),
3. Since political information is critical factor in OMA framework, change of media environment leads to change in political opportunities, motivations, and ability.
If readers familiar with Prior’s journal articles published in top-tiered political science journals, they will follow his argument rapidly (Of course, many of chapters are based on his records of publication).
Important study giving readers great insight… However, I have one more question that I am always curious with. If some people who do not want to listen, see, or learn anything about politics, then their lives in low media-choice (i.e., situations that they had to absorb political information without any voluntary willingness) can be good? Further, their lives in such situations can be ideal or desirable, from the perspective of political regime called plural democracy?
I assume that many scholars took implicit assumption that more knowledge and more importantly more active voting should be needed, and any situations hurting those ideals would erode democracy. Probably true, but personal opinion is this sounds too much eliticism in these arguments. As I more read about so-called empirical political studies, I have to confess that these studies clearly demonstrated that any democracy has to be unequal. Powerful people have powerful voice (not desirable, but this seems okay, at least to me), but too frequently, weak people’s voices have copied powerful people’s voice, and simply justifying the preexisting regime and its structure.
What about Swifter – borrowed from Prior’s terms? If they learned something about politics, and if they participated due to the gained knowledge, their participation would reflect sincere and genuine their interest? Or simple swung by intensity of marketing-type electoral campaigns? How can we be certain that their knowledge and their participation are merely pseudo-knowledge or pseudo-participation?
If people do not want to be informed, is it better way to let them be uninformed and to let them escape their unwanted duty from the choice of collective decisionmaking?
Although I said above, I am not certain that this seems right. Just thought.
Anyway, Prior’s “Post-broadcast democracy” is good piece and enjoyable book, I believe.
Obviously, recent trend in public opinion studies has emphasized the importance of exogenous factors, such as community environment (e.g., racial composition, or population density, or community income level), median environment like the main predictor variable in this study (e.g., the number of stations, or the time when the cable television was introduced).
Markus Prior’s study seems plausible and his evidence is telling and supportive of what he wants to say in his book. The main arguments in this book,
1. Recently, media provide more choice (or opportunities) for people,
2. People have different media content preference, which influences the intake of their political information (measured as relative entertainment preference),
3. Since political information is critical factor in OMA framework, change of media environment leads to change in political opportunities, motivations, and ability.
If readers familiar with Prior’s journal articles published in top-tiered political science journals, they will follow his argument rapidly (Of course, many of chapters are based on his records of publication).
Important study giving readers great insight… However, I have one more question that I am always curious with. If some people who do not want to listen, see, or learn anything about politics, then their lives in low media-choice (i.e., situations that they had to absorb political information without any voluntary willingness) can be good? Further, their lives in such situations can be ideal or desirable, from the perspective of political regime called plural democracy?
I assume that many scholars took implicit assumption that more knowledge and more importantly more active voting should be needed, and any situations hurting those ideals would erode democracy. Probably true, but personal opinion is this sounds too much eliticism in these arguments. As I more read about so-called empirical political studies, I have to confess that these studies clearly demonstrated that any democracy has to be unequal. Powerful people have powerful voice (not desirable, but this seems okay, at least to me), but too frequently, weak people’s voices have copied powerful people’s voice, and simply justifying the preexisting regime and its structure.
What about Swifter – borrowed from Prior’s terms? If they learned something about politics, and if they participated due to the gained knowledge, their participation would reflect sincere and genuine their interest? Or simple swung by intensity of marketing-type electoral campaigns? How can we be certain that their knowledge and their participation are merely pseudo-knowledge or pseudo-participation?
If people do not want to be informed, is it better way to let them be uninformed and to let them escape their unwanted duty from the choice of collective decisionmaking?
Although I said above, I am not certain that this seems right. Just thought.
Anyway, Prior’s “Post-broadcast democracy” is good piece and enjoyable book, I believe.
Monday, November 29, 2010
Us against them - Kinder & Kam (2009)
Kinder, Donald R., and Cindy D. Kam. 2009. Us against them : ethnocentric foundations of American opinion. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press.
Probably it is true that Professor Donald Kinder is active and productive scholar whose works are widely acknowledged and cited. If you read the back of the book’s cover, there are very famous scholars’ recommendations for this book. For example, Samuel Popkin, Jack Citrin, Stanley Feldman. I am not sure how much attention the recommenders paid on this newest book authored by Donald Kinder, but I have to confess that this book is the most disappointing work among Professor Kinder’s great pieces.
To be honest, I was deeply moved by his previous book, titled Divided by Color (authored with Lynn Sanders). Divided by Color was, in my reading, very impressive and well written with provisions of many insightful arguments and straightforward and concise quantitative analyses with theoretically cogent descriptions. While later works of Paul Sniderman (e.g., Reaching beyond race) counterargued or doubted the conclusion, I truly believe that the book was, by itself, one of the greatest books written during 1990s.
This book, however, contains many parts with which I cannot agree. First, the measures of ethnocentrism were hardly related with ‘ethnicity’ that was popularly defined in social scientific research. Actually, the measure is nothing but ‘race-centrism’ because the measure is based on evaluation of own racial category against averaged evaluation of other racial categories. As far as I’ve remember, there were no discussion, or more precisely theoretical justifications, showing why racial category should be equated with ethnic category. The authors introduced two measures: one of them is based on traits of a group which is widely adopted to measure racial stereotype, and the other is based on feeling thermometer toward each racial category. If the authors replaced ‘ethnocentrism’ with ‘raciocentrism,’ my dissatisfactions would be reduced.
Second, relating to the first one, I cannot understand why evaluation of racial group comparison (ingroup minus averaged outgroups) predict international politics or other domestic issues. If one European American had relatively higher (i.e., more positive or warmer) evaluation on own racial group against other racial groups, then why he (or she) opposed foreign aids? I believe the results are clearly interpretable if the variable is truly an operationalization of ethnocentrism (Americans against Non-Americans). However, the measure (even if it was termed as ethnocentrism) compares white Americans against non-white Americans?
Third, among the theories introduced in the second chapter (if the introduction chapter is treated as the first chapter), the fourth one is highly misleading, I think, given the results are true. The fourth one is based on socio-biology (e.g., Edward Wilson). Personally, I have no opposition to genetic theories and their application in social behaviors. Since the graduation of undergraduate, I have no formal education of natural science, and thus I have no ability to judge whether sociobiology is true or not. The problem (probably the biggest one I felt, when reading the book) was the serious naïve measure of racial categories (ie., white, black, Hispanic, and Asians) which was wedded with genes that should be sophisticated and only can be measured through nano-technology. For example, imagine one Chinese and one Indian, and one Arabian. The three people are very different, in terms of genes. To be honest, an Indian might be closer to Europeans, rather than Mongolians or other races. Even if national origins can be traced, it is actually impossible to classify one person as ‘white.’ Sincerely, I believe that the fourth theory should be deleted from the list (1) because the authors do not provide any results or data that can support (or reject) the theoretical arguments, (2) because naïve racial category is convenient one, rather than scientific one, and (3) because the mismatch between racial category in opinion polls and scientific genes seriously erodes the quality of the interpretation of the results.
My reactions might be harsh. Probably, I felt disappointed because the previous book (Divided by color) was so wonderful that this book would maintain similar level of beauty and cogency and soundness and insights.
I am sure that lots of people (whether the reader was an academic reader or a general reader) may fully agree with the conclusion of this book (Us against them), but I am also sure that I cannot be one of such people.
Probably it is true that Professor Donald Kinder is active and productive scholar whose works are widely acknowledged and cited. If you read the back of the book’s cover, there are very famous scholars’ recommendations for this book. For example, Samuel Popkin, Jack Citrin, Stanley Feldman. I am not sure how much attention the recommenders paid on this newest book authored by Donald Kinder, but I have to confess that this book is the most disappointing work among Professor Kinder’s great pieces.
To be honest, I was deeply moved by his previous book, titled Divided by Color (authored with Lynn Sanders). Divided by Color was, in my reading, very impressive and well written with provisions of many insightful arguments and straightforward and concise quantitative analyses with theoretically cogent descriptions. While later works of Paul Sniderman (e.g., Reaching beyond race) counterargued or doubted the conclusion, I truly believe that the book was, by itself, one of the greatest books written during 1990s.
This book, however, contains many parts with which I cannot agree. First, the measures of ethnocentrism were hardly related with ‘ethnicity’ that was popularly defined in social scientific research. Actually, the measure is nothing but ‘race-centrism’ because the measure is based on evaluation of own racial category against averaged evaluation of other racial categories. As far as I’ve remember, there were no discussion, or more precisely theoretical justifications, showing why racial category should be equated with ethnic category. The authors introduced two measures: one of them is based on traits of a group which is widely adopted to measure racial stereotype, and the other is based on feeling thermometer toward each racial category. If the authors replaced ‘ethnocentrism’ with ‘raciocentrism,’ my dissatisfactions would be reduced.
Second, relating to the first one, I cannot understand why evaluation of racial group comparison (ingroup minus averaged outgroups) predict international politics or other domestic issues. If one European American had relatively higher (i.e., more positive or warmer) evaluation on own racial group against other racial groups, then why he (or she) opposed foreign aids? I believe the results are clearly interpretable if the variable is truly an operationalization of ethnocentrism (Americans against Non-Americans). However, the measure (even if it was termed as ethnocentrism) compares white Americans against non-white Americans?
Third, among the theories introduced in the second chapter (if the introduction chapter is treated as the first chapter), the fourth one is highly misleading, I think, given the results are true. The fourth one is based on socio-biology (e.g., Edward Wilson). Personally, I have no opposition to genetic theories and their application in social behaviors. Since the graduation of undergraduate, I have no formal education of natural science, and thus I have no ability to judge whether sociobiology is true or not. The problem (probably the biggest one I felt, when reading the book) was the serious naïve measure of racial categories (ie., white, black, Hispanic, and Asians) which was wedded with genes that should be sophisticated and only can be measured through nano-technology. For example, imagine one Chinese and one Indian, and one Arabian. The three people are very different, in terms of genes. To be honest, an Indian might be closer to Europeans, rather than Mongolians or other races. Even if national origins can be traced, it is actually impossible to classify one person as ‘white.’ Sincerely, I believe that the fourth theory should be deleted from the list (1) because the authors do not provide any results or data that can support (or reject) the theoretical arguments, (2) because naïve racial category is convenient one, rather than scientific one, and (3) because the mismatch between racial category in opinion polls and scientific genes seriously erodes the quality of the interpretation of the results.
My reactions might be harsh. Probably, I felt disappointed because the previous book (Divided by color) was so wonderful that this book would maintain similar level of beauty and cogency and soundness and insights.
I am sure that lots of people (whether the reader was an academic reader or a general reader) may fully agree with the conclusion of this book (Us against them), but I am also sure that I cannot be one of such people.
Sunday, November 28, 2010
Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics - Edited by Jeffrey Haynes (2010)
Haynes, Jeffrey, ed. 2010. Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Handbook is the great guide for the beginner of the field, like me who are recently interested in the relationship between politics and religion. My approach (not yet self-assured) assume that religion is a machine of ethical messages which regulate or guide people’s judgment over social objects; and also assume that politics is a symbolic process created by political actors whose messages combine materialistic interests, moral superiority, and constructed social knowledge over the natural and cultural world. With the message as the conceptual link, I believe (or assume) that religion and politics reciprocally influence (actually, nearly all social scientists know that they are under mutual influence).
Anyway, the coverage of the handbook is so huge. Except the introduction chapter authored by the editor, there are four parts, as follow:
Part I: The world religions and politics
Part II: Religion and governance
Part III: Religion and international relations
Part IV: Religion security and development
I skipped all the chapters, but I do want to make an index what chapters might be re-read in the future (if my interest is maintained in the near or distance future)
Chapter 2: Buddhism and politics (by Peter Freidlander): Why? 1) S. Koran has lots of Buddhists. 2) Mostly known as its non-violent tendency (compared with other religions).
Chapter 3: Christianity: Protestantism (by Paul Fireston): Why? 1) the traditional topic since Max Weber’s intellectual invention. 2) the religious majority in US
Chapter 4: The Catholic church and Catholicism in global politics (Allen Hertzke): Why? 1) the biggest religious institution in the world 2) in S Korea, Catholic’s social contribution is most prominent (pro-democratization)
Chapter 5: Confucianism, from above and below (Michael Barr): 1) is it religion? (I don’t think so) It seems more likely to be an ideology like Liberalism, Maxism, etc. 2) basically ambivalent, and under-developed political ideology which can be both progressive and recessive.
Chapter 7: Islam and Islamism (Andrea Teti & Andrea Mura): 1) I am very ignorant of Islam and its culture
Chapter 10: Secularisation and politics (Steve Bruce): 1) Interesting and also important topic in the relationship between politics and religion, 2) secularization, in my view, is contested concept. Not sure what is secular and not sure whether ‘secular’ is distinguished from ‘sacred’ in terms of spirituality or religiosity.
Chapter 11: Religious fundamentalisms (Jeffrey Haynes): 1) Rising political tendency
Chapter 15: Religion and civil society (David Herbert): Personally, I read this chapter with the biggest interest and fun.
Chapter 16: Religious commitment and socio-political orientations: Different patterns of compartmentalism among Muslims and Christians? (Thorleif Petterson) 1) Model paper dealing with the effect of religion on politics using quantitative data. 2) good study to counter-argue over-exaggerated differences between Christians and Muslims.
Chapter 23: Religion and women: Canadian women’s religious volunteering: compassion, connections and comparisons (Brenda O’Neill): Good study showing the ambivalent characteristics of religion and its role in civil society (positive because it educates females as connected and communitarian citizens; negative because its role is highly concentrated in family and other conventionally women’s roles).
Chapter 25: Changing the climate of religious internationalism: evangelical responses to global warming and human suffering (Noah J. Toly): Dealing with the connection between religious messages and environmental issues (global warming). Personally more interesting because of the re-modeling four rivers in S. Korea despite the majority’s opposition, especially led by religious leaders who are Buddhist monks and Catholic priests including only a few Protestant pastors.
Handbook is the great guide for the beginner of the field, like me who are recently interested in the relationship between politics and religion. My approach (not yet self-assured) assume that religion is a machine of ethical messages which regulate or guide people’s judgment over social objects; and also assume that politics is a symbolic process created by political actors whose messages combine materialistic interests, moral superiority, and constructed social knowledge over the natural and cultural world. With the message as the conceptual link, I believe (or assume) that religion and politics reciprocally influence (actually, nearly all social scientists know that they are under mutual influence).
Anyway, the coverage of the handbook is so huge. Except the introduction chapter authored by the editor, there are four parts, as follow:
Part I: The world religions and politics
Part II: Religion and governance
Part III: Religion and international relations
Part IV: Religion security and development
I skipped all the chapters, but I do want to make an index what chapters might be re-read in the future (if my interest is maintained in the near or distance future)
Chapter 2: Buddhism and politics (by Peter Freidlander): Why? 1) S. Koran has lots of Buddhists. 2) Mostly known as its non-violent tendency (compared with other religions).
Chapter 3: Christianity: Protestantism (by Paul Fireston): Why? 1) the traditional topic since Max Weber’s intellectual invention. 2) the religious majority in US
Chapter 4: The Catholic church and Catholicism in global politics (Allen Hertzke): Why? 1) the biggest religious institution in the world 2) in S Korea, Catholic’s social contribution is most prominent (pro-democratization)
Chapter 5: Confucianism, from above and below (Michael Barr): 1) is it religion? (I don’t think so) It seems more likely to be an ideology like Liberalism, Maxism, etc. 2) basically ambivalent, and under-developed political ideology which can be both progressive and recessive.
Chapter 7: Islam and Islamism (Andrea Teti & Andrea Mura): 1) I am very ignorant of Islam and its culture
Chapter 10: Secularisation and politics (Steve Bruce): 1) Interesting and also important topic in the relationship between politics and religion, 2) secularization, in my view, is contested concept. Not sure what is secular and not sure whether ‘secular’ is distinguished from ‘sacred’ in terms of spirituality or religiosity.
Chapter 11: Religious fundamentalisms (Jeffrey Haynes): 1) Rising political tendency
Chapter 15: Religion and civil society (David Herbert): Personally, I read this chapter with the biggest interest and fun.
Chapter 16: Religious commitment and socio-political orientations: Different patterns of compartmentalism among Muslims and Christians? (Thorleif Petterson) 1) Model paper dealing with the effect of religion on politics using quantitative data. 2) good study to counter-argue over-exaggerated differences between Christians and Muslims.
Chapter 23: Religion and women: Canadian women’s religious volunteering: compassion, connections and comparisons (Brenda O’Neill): Good study showing the ambivalent characteristics of religion and its role in civil society (positive because it educates females as connected and communitarian citizens; negative because its role is highly concentrated in family and other conventionally women’s roles).
Chapter 25: Changing the climate of religious internationalism: evangelical responses to global warming and human suffering (Noah J. Toly): Dealing with the connection between religious messages and environmental issues (global warming). Personally more interesting because of the re-modeling four rivers in S. Korea despite the majority’s opposition, especially led by religious leaders who are Buddhist monks and Catholic priests including only a few Protestant pastors.
What's Fair - Jennifer Hochschild (1981)
Hochschild, Jennifer L. 1981. What's Fair: American Beliefs About Distributive Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reading thick book -- to a student who is pressured to read lots of literature for a short time -- is not easy work, but fruitful labor for the future study. I believe Jennifer Hochschild’s book belongs to this category (reading all pages in the book is not easy, but fruitful).
There are -- I believe -- two purposes in this book: one is explicit, and the other is implicit. The explicit purpose of this book is academic investigation of the reason “why there is not socialism in American” asked by Sombart. The duopoly system of American politics does not allow the emergency of socialism, as many political observers agreed. While some extreme conservatives may consider Barack Obama as a socialist, this type of hyper-over-misperception among extremists exists in any society. As George W. Bush cannot be equated with Hitler, any Democrat party’s politicians cannot be equated with socialists.
Of course, Hochschild’s conclusion is not about American political institution(s) or systematic analyses. Her strategies are close to Antonio Gramsci’s analyses of civil society. Citizens feel, interpret and behave politically based on their experiences and (subjective) justice or principles. As many poor people would complain, make voice for better treatment, or revolts, American poor people do the same, but they give up dreaming alternative better world, or they just dream without any actions, or their voice or action seems so weak. Her findings are well summarized in the book. First, there are two principles -- equality vs. differentiation. Second, there are three parts in a society -- society vs. economy vs. state (politics). Third, people, in general, agreed on the use of equality rule in the two areas of society and state, but ask the use of economy rule in the area of economy. Fourth, people become ambivalent, and thus feeling frustrated, angry, or transcendent. Finally, people do not realize any thoughts that may be as similar as socialism observed in Western Europe.
The second purpose is implicit and more oriented to academic audience. As she consistently argued in the last two chapters, her project highly resembles that of Robert Lane’s in both theoretically and methodologically. The motivation for the second purpose might emerge because of the influential writing of Philip Converse, arguing that ordinary people cannot understand and/or judge political issues using ideological constraint. The debate is well summarized in the second last chapter (Ambivalence chapter), and I do not feel it is worth to summarize the two sides. Anyway, her conclusion is that people’s understanding of a society is well structured within each domain (here, the three parts of a society), but critical inconsistency or confusion emerges when contrasting principles between different domains clash.
When reading the book, I’ve met so-called ideal type people we might still encounter in any society. Among the interviewed people, Maria got most of my attention. Why are there so many people who are honest, good, and hardworking but poor and alienated? This question is the main question I have, but no answers, unfortunately, I have made.
By the way, her later books highly focuses on the community and school, race, and other issues that are rooted in the social skin, which is essentially ambivalent. Civil society (although she did not use the term in the book, as far as I remember) is both progressive and conservative. As she said in the book, individual ambivalence reflects social contradiction where many interests, principles, justices, and causes fight each other.
Reading thick book -- to a student who is pressured to read lots of literature for a short time -- is not easy work, but fruitful labor for the future study. I believe Jennifer Hochschild’s book belongs to this category (reading all pages in the book is not easy, but fruitful).
There are -- I believe -- two purposes in this book: one is explicit, and the other is implicit. The explicit purpose of this book is academic investigation of the reason “why there is not socialism in American” asked by Sombart. The duopoly system of American politics does not allow the emergency of socialism, as many political observers agreed. While some extreme conservatives may consider Barack Obama as a socialist, this type of hyper-over-misperception among extremists exists in any society. As George W. Bush cannot be equated with Hitler, any Democrat party’s politicians cannot be equated with socialists.
Of course, Hochschild’s conclusion is not about American political institution(s) or systematic analyses. Her strategies are close to Antonio Gramsci’s analyses of civil society. Citizens feel, interpret and behave politically based on their experiences and (subjective) justice or principles. As many poor people would complain, make voice for better treatment, or revolts, American poor people do the same, but they give up dreaming alternative better world, or they just dream without any actions, or their voice or action seems so weak. Her findings are well summarized in the book. First, there are two principles -- equality vs. differentiation. Second, there are three parts in a society -- society vs. economy vs. state (politics). Third, people, in general, agreed on the use of equality rule in the two areas of society and state, but ask the use of economy rule in the area of economy. Fourth, people become ambivalent, and thus feeling frustrated, angry, or transcendent. Finally, people do not realize any thoughts that may be as similar as socialism observed in Western Europe.
The second purpose is implicit and more oriented to academic audience. As she consistently argued in the last two chapters, her project highly resembles that of Robert Lane’s in both theoretically and methodologically. The motivation for the second purpose might emerge because of the influential writing of Philip Converse, arguing that ordinary people cannot understand and/or judge political issues using ideological constraint. The debate is well summarized in the second last chapter (Ambivalence chapter), and I do not feel it is worth to summarize the two sides. Anyway, her conclusion is that people’s understanding of a society is well structured within each domain (here, the three parts of a society), but critical inconsistency or confusion emerges when contrasting principles between different domains clash.
When reading the book, I’ve met so-called ideal type people we might still encounter in any society. Among the interviewed people, Maria got most of my attention. Why are there so many people who are honest, good, and hardworking but poor and alienated? This question is the main question I have, but no answers, unfortunately, I have made.
By the way, her later books highly focuses on the community and school, race, and other issues that are rooted in the social skin, which is essentially ambivalent. Civil society (although she did not use the term in the book, as far as I remember) is both progressive and conservative. As she said in the book, individual ambivalence reflects social contradiction where many interests, principles, justices, and causes fight each other.
Monday, November 22, 2010
Ralph Nader - Marcello (2004)
Marcello, Patricia Cronin. 2004. Ralph Nader : a biography. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
To be honest, this book is not for a scholar, but the general republic. However, a reader like me (an international student from authoritarian political regime) might get much information from this kind of easily written book. Before reading this book, Ralph Nader is a person who has been running many presidential campaigns (that does not seem possible under the duopoly system in American politics), and a person who was a consumer activist who was also known as public spoiler.
Obviously, this book is very positive toward Ralph Nader (with only a few negative comments of critics on Nader’s achievements). Thus, a naïve reader like me should be more careful to say who Ralph Nader is (and was).
Chapter 1 is mainly about childhood and lives in Princeton and Harvard. Most of information does not seem attractive.
Chapter 2 is about his activity about consumer’s auto-safety. The first work seems very impressive to me because his initial political works start with legal works, rather than orthodox political ones or grass-rooted movements. Probably his previous careers as a muckraking journalist might be the seed for his entire career.
Chapter 3 is that his legal work became enlarged and was turned into a conventional political work, i.e., moving the congress by advising politicians.
Chapter 4 describes the enlarged human network of Nader, and how to extend his cause with other good men’s works. Chapter 5 is about the climax of Nader’s Raiders’ work and their influence in 1960-1970’s.
Chapter 6-7 describe the weakening influence or performance of Nader-like movements in American society, and his personal loss and his stepping back from the front of the movements.
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 are about the rebounding of his causes and justice in 1980’s conservative period in American society. As known, the resignation of Nixon and the election of President Carter is the short time rebound of so-called Democratic spirit, but it suddenly turns to conservative minds symbolized as Ronald Reagan.
Chapter 10 and Chapter 11 are about his challenge (probably hopeless) for American presidency for disseminating his cause in American Society. Partly, this period is the new-Democrat period symbolized as William Clinton. Actually, he is not an orthodox Democrat (probably, that’s the reason why he succeeded with many and many obstacles and misfortunes). While not clearly noted, Nader’s challenges are an expression of despair over the weakly represented progressive idea in Democratic Party. In the system of duopoly, it is near impossible to be elected as President (and even Senator, less but still difficult for Congressman), whether a politician is Green party, Reform party, or Socialism party. Probably, the trial was to keep the fire of alternative progressive idea (e.g., environmentalism) being firing.
The last chapter is the close chapter that portrays Nader’s activities after the defeat of 2000 Election until 2003.
Good introduction to who Nader is, I believe.
As an international student who has very very ambivalent feelings toward American politics, I have to confess that the existence of Nader is the evidence showing American society is healthy and can be a light for other worlds (even if it is not the perfect light-rod). His action and causes, without no doubt, are for the social weak or weak things (like birds, wild lives) rather than the socially powerful or wealthy ones. In my belief, the good society (democratic society, if you want) is the society where any person can fight for voices of the weak without feeling to be hurt by governmental forces. My home country, in this respect, is still inferior to the U.S. Although the U.S. is not the ideal nation-state in my mind, she, in some sense, can give hope.
To be honest, this book is not for a scholar, but the general republic. However, a reader like me (an international student from authoritarian political regime) might get much information from this kind of easily written book. Before reading this book, Ralph Nader is a person who has been running many presidential campaigns (that does not seem possible under the duopoly system in American politics), and a person who was a consumer activist who was also known as public spoiler.
Obviously, this book is very positive toward Ralph Nader (with only a few negative comments of critics on Nader’s achievements). Thus, a naïve reader like me should be more careful to say who Ralph Nader is (and was).
Chapter 1 is mainly about childhood and lives in Princeton and Harvard. Most of information does not seem attractive.
Chapter 2 is about his activity about consumer’s auto-safety. The first work seems very impressive to me because his initial political works start with legal works, rather than orthodox political ones or grass-rooted movements. Probably his previous careers as a muckraking journalist might be the seed for his entire career.
Chapter 3 is that his legal work became enlarged and was turned into a conventional political work, i.e., moving the congress by advising politicians.
Chapter 4 describes the enlarged human network of Nader, and how to extend his cause with other good men’s works. Chapter 5 is about the climax of Nader’s Raiders’ work and their influence in 1960-1970’s.
Chapter 6-7 describe the weakening influence or performance of Nader-like movements in American society, and his personal loss and his stepping back from the front of the movements.
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 are about the rebounding of his causes and justice in 1980’s conservative period in American society. As known, the resignation of Nixon and the election of President Carter is the short time rebound of so-called Democratic spirit, but it suddenly turns to conservative minds symbolized as Ronald Reagan.
Chapter 10 and Chapter 11 are about his challenge (probably hopeless) for American presidency for disseminating his cause in American Society. Partly, this period is the new-Democrat period symbolized as William Clinton. Actually, he is not an orthodox Democrat (probably, that’s the reason why he succeeded with many and many obstacles and misfortunes). While not clearly noted, Nader’s challenges are an expression of despair over the weakly represented progressive idea in Democratic Party. In the system of duopoly, it is near impossible to be elected as President (and even Senator, less but still difficult for Congressman), whether a politician is Green party, Reform party, or Socialism party. Probably, the trial was to keep the fire of alternative progressive idea (e.g., environmentalism) being firing.
The last chapter is the close chapter that portrays Nader’s activities after the defeat of 2000 Election until 2003.
Good introduction to who Nader is, I believe.
As an international student who has very very ambivalent feelings toward American politics, I have to confess that the existence of Nader is the evidence showing American society is healthy and can be a light for other worlds (even if it is not the perfect light-rod). His action and causes, without no doubt, are for the social weak or weak things (like birds, wild lives) rather than the socially powerful or wealthy ones. In my belief, the good society (democratic society, if you want) is the society where any person can fight for voices of the weak without feeling to be hurt by governmental forces. My home country, in this respect, is still inferior to the U.S. Although the U.S. is not the ideal nation-state in my mind, she, in some sense, can give hope.
Friday, November 19, 2010
When atheism becomes religion - Chris Hedges (2009)
Hedges, Chris. 2009. When atheism becomes religion : America's new fundamentalists. New York: Free Press.
Actually the title of the book (originally, I don’t believe in atheists, in 2008) summarizes what the author wants to argue in the book. The core is clear: The arrogant pseudo-scientific atheism is actually the same as any arrogant religious fundamentalism. In other words, atheists and religious bigotry are the same because of their philosophical foundation, i.e., fundamentalism contaminated by violent utopian ideas.
Hedges argues that this pseudo-scientific fundamentalists are originated from the legacy – specifically bad legacy of Enlightenment in Western Europe. Blind obedience to the progress of human moral. As far as I’ve understood, this type of naïve optimism about the reality is the enemy that he wanted to accuse in the previous book. Specifically he mentions Harris, Dawkins, Wilson, Blackmore, and others as examples of pseudo-scientific atheists.
The biggest virtue of this book is the beautifully wedded couple of “common-sensical ethical arguments” and “ethics based on REAL experience of the author (as a war correspondent).” Scientists, especially arm-chaired scientists studying and researching in the library or office, are easily distracted or tempted by seriously abstract thoughts that are sometimes sur-real. Those arguments frequently are based on hypothetically assumed person, rather than a real person who is crying, sweating, or bleeding. Actually criticizing religious creeds is so easy because I believe any bibles (of course, including Christian Bible) have very very contrasting and conflicting teachings. In one page, it teaches endless altruism or self-sacrifice, but suddenly it orders its believers to kill others without any mercy. The evil teaching can be easily mobilized for the justifications of genocide, adultery, illegal polygamy and the like. However, it is also similarly easy to criticize bad consequences contrived by modern science (or scientific devices) like atomic bombs and MDW.
From the ordinary mind (at least my mind), it is not fair to compare good science with bad religion, as pseudo-scientists do. (the exactly opposite case would be true, either). I believe the author’s critic on pseudo-scientific atheists is not critics on all modern science. He, I assume, simply warns the arrogance of such atheists and the danger such arrogance would result, as blind religious fundamentalists do.
Some limitations are observed. First, this book is very thin, compared with the previous one (American Fascists). I assume the reason might be the author’s hastiness, in order to reply to people who may misunderstand him as one of such atheists. Second, his critics are mainly about the attitude or viewpoints of such atheists, rather than their over-interpretation of scientific findings (especially, evolutionary biology). While he mentioned Charles Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and other so-called orthodox scientists, his study does not cover recent achievements in such field. Of course, it is not the author’s duty to do that because it is not his speciality. However, it is a little bit disappointing not to analyze why such writers show such seemingly arrogant “over-confidence” over the findings… Finally, when analyzing meme theory, I assume he seems to over-generalize the implications of meme theory. While it is actually true that meme theory is too much contaminated by misguided evolutionary biology, it is also true that it is simply a way to explain social or cultural phenomena, based on biological explanations. I have to disagree with some analyses about meme theory. All types of knowledge are inter-influenced by other types of knowledge. For example, is it true that Aristotelian philosophy influences St. Aquina’s theology?
Despite some limitations (actually my dissatisfactions), I am satisfied with the book (as one of the general and ordinary readers)
PS: As a ph.d student, this book taught me many lessions about knowledge, especially so-called scientific knowledge. At least, it tells that precise theory at the level of high abstraction is bad theory at the mundane level. Especially, social sciences… Society is not abstract, it is real. (Unless you live in a place of full anarchy).
Actually the title of the book (originally, I don’t believe in atheists, in 2008) summarizes what the author wants to argue in the book. The core is clear: The arrogant pseudo-scientific atheism is actually the same as any arrogant religious fundamentalism. In other words, atheists and religious bigotry are the same because of their philosophical foundation, i.e., fundamentalism contaminated by violent utopian ideas.
Hedges argues that this pseudo-scientific fundamentalists are originated from the legacy – specifically bad legacy of Enlightenment in Western Europe. Blind obedience to the progress of human moral. As far as I’ve understood, this type of naïve optimism about the reality is the enemy that he wanted to accuse in the previous book. Specifically he mentions Harris, Dawkins, Wilson, Blackmore, and others as examples of pseudo-scientific atheists.
The biggest virtue of this book is the beautifully wedded couple of “common-sensical ethical arguments” and “ethics based on REAL experience of the author (as a war correspondent).” Scientists, especially arm-chaired scientists studying and researching in the library or office, are easily distracted or tempted by seriously abstract thoughts that are sometimes sur-real. Those arguments frequently are based on hypothetically assumed person, rather than a real person who is crying, sweating, or bleeding. Actually criticizing religious creeds is so easy because I believe any bibles (of course, including Christian Bible) have very very contrasting and conflicting teachings. In one page, it teaches endless altruism or self-sacrifice, but suddenly it orders its believers to kill others without any mercy. The evil teaching can be easily mobilized for the justifications of genocide, adultery, illegal polygamy and the like. However, it is also similarly easy to criticize bad consequences contrived by modern science (or scientific devices) like atomic bombs and MDW.
From the ordinary mind (at least my mind), it is not fair to compare good science with bad religion, as pseudo-scientists do. (the exactly opposite case would be true, either). I believe the author’s critic on pseudo-scientific atheists is not critics on all modern science. He, I assume, simply warns the arrogance of such atheists and the danger such arrogance would result, as blind religious fundamentalists do.
Some limitations are observed. First, this book is very thin, compared with the previous one (American Fascists). I assume the reason might be the author’s hastiness, in order to reply to people who may misunderstand him as one of such atheists. Second, his critics are mainly about the attitude or viewpoints of such atheists, rather than their over-interpretation of scientific findings (especially, evolutionary biology). While he mentioned Charles Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and other so-called orthodox scientists, his study does not cover recent achievements in such field. Of course, it is not the author’s duty to do that because it is not his speciality. However, it is a little bit disappointing not to analyze why such writers show such seemingly arrogant “over-confidence” over the findings… Finally, when analyzing meme theory, I assume he seems to over-generalize the implications of meme theory. While it is actually true that meme theory is too much contaminated by misguided evolutionary biology, it is also true that it is simply a way to explain social or cultural phenomena, based on biological explanations. I have to disagree with some analyses about meme theory. All types of knowledge are inter-influenced by other types of knowledge. For example, is it true that Aristotelian philosophy influences St. Aquina’s theology?
Despite some limitations (actually my dissatisfactions), I am satisfied with the book (as one of the general and ordinary readers)
PS: As a ph.d student, this book taught me many lessions about knowledge, especially so-called scientific knowledge. At least, it tells that precise theory at the level of high abstraction is bad theory at the mundane level. Especially, social sciences… Society is not abstract, it is real. (Unless you live in a place of full anarchy).
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